WSX35 -Financial assumptions underpinning the plan

Business plan 2025-2030



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# WSX35 - Financial assumptions underpinning the plan

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For annexes, see Supporting Document WSX36 – Annexes – Financial assumptions underpinning the plan

*This supporting document is part of Wessex Water's business plan for 2025-2030.* 

Please see 'WSX00 – Navigation document' for where this document sits within our business plan submission.

More information can be found at wessexwater.co.uk.

## **Executive summary**

This section contains financial information and explanations that support readers' understanding of our PR24 plan.

## 1. Cost Recovery

## 1.1. Pay As You Go (PAYG) Rates

PAYG rates determine the proportion of expenditure in a given year that customers pay for upfront (i.e., what we collect directly as revenues, colloquially fast money). Expenditure that we do not recover up front (slow money) instead gets added to our RCV and is assumed to be funded through debt / equity.

### Our approach to setting PAYG rates

Historically we have set PAYG rates to collect our operating expenditure and infrastructure renewals expenditure (IRE) despite a portion of this being recognised as capital expenditure. This was set to provide consistency with approaches to cost recovery taken at prior price controls, particularly with the accounting treatment of IRE prior to adoption of full IFRS accounting standards. Under the old UK GAAP standards our assumed infrastructure depreciation was broadly equivalent to our IRE. Under IFRS we capitalise and depreciate in a conventional way a portion of this expenditure, while a portion is recognised as operating expenditure.

Setting the PAYG rate to recover all IRE presents some complications:

- It requires additional adjustments to key financial indictors specifically interest covers,
- It appears out of sync with current accounting standards,
- It increases the immediate impact on customer bills arising from increases in IRE,
- It reduces transparency as the rates are often complex to calculate from the submitted data tables,
- It creates differences of approach across the industry.

Considering these, with a particular eye on affordability, we are setting our PAYG rates at the natural rate, as determined by the forecast net opex capex split. The capitalised IRE will instead be added to our RCV.

Due to the size and scale of the investment programme required alongside the adjustments made to PAYG rates to address finance-ability at PR19 we have not viewed comparisons to current PAYG rates as a meaningful test.

### Assessing the impact of this change

This change in approach reduces the amount of revenue we recover in period by c£190m, the split by price control can be seen in Table 1 below.

Area	Reduction in fast money	Indicative headline bill impact
Water Supply	£100m	-c£25 per cust/yr
Wastewater	£90m	-£12 per cust/yr

Table 1:Impact of change to our PAYG rates

This will create an ongoing bill impact over future years, c£8 on water supply and c£3 per customer per year on wastewater. However, when we consider an indicative 30-year discounted cashflow view, both flows create a net positive position for customers.

The outcome of this 30-year impact assessment and the immediate pressure on bills arising from substantial investment gives us confidence our approach represents the best option for customers.

### Calculation of our rates

Given this approach our rates can be clearly and transparently calculated from our published tables. Our calculations are set out by price control (Water Resources - Table 2; Water Network - Table 3; Wastewater Network - Table 4; Bioresources - Table 5) below:

	, aloc					
Water Resources	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	Calculation
Net opex	14.797	14.861	14.483	14.265	15.014	From RR2
Net capex	24.532	19.963	19.749	25.911	23.688	From RR2
Net totex	39.329	34.824	34.232	40.176	38.702	Net opex + net capex
PAYG rate	37.6%	42.7%	42.3%	35.5%	38.8%	Net opex / net totex

Table 2: Water Resources rates

#### Table 3: Water Network rates

Water Network	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	Calculation	
Net opex	90.791	94.169	93.744	94.157	98.182	From RR2	
Net capex	103.991	105.582	114.463	113.050	106.892	From RR2	
Net totex	194.782	199.751	208.208	207.207	205.074	Net opex + net capex	
PAYG rate	46.6%	47.1%	45.0%	45.4%	47.9%	Net opex / net totex	

#### Table 4: Wastewater Network rates

Wastewater Network	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	Calculation
Net opex	118.822	123.603	125.173	128.961	155.306	From RR2
Net capex	362.728	359.025	437.516	536.617	561.669	From RR2
Net totex	481.550	482.628	562.689	665.578	716.975	Net opex + net capex
PAYG rate	24.7%	25.6%	22.2%	19.4%	21.7%	Net opex / net totex

Bioresources	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	

Table 5: Bioresources rates

Bioresources	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	Calculation
Net opex	45.375	49.381	49.841	52.525	54.362	From RR2
Net capex	65.295	133.674	89.219	80.776	50.257	From RR2
Net totex	110.670	183.055	139.059	133.301	104.619	Net opex + net capex
PAYG rate	41.0%	27.0%	35.8%	39.4%	52.0%	Net opex / net totex

Due to the size and scale of the investment programme required, we have not viewed comparisons to current PAYG rates as a meaningful test.

#### **RCV Run-off Rates** 1.2.

RCV run off rates are the mechanism through which customers pay for the RCV which was initially financed through a mixture of debt and equity. The RCV run off rate represents the percentage of the RCV each year that we reduce the RCV by, this reduction being recovered as revenue from customers.

#### 1.2.1. Our approach to setting RCV run off rates

Conceptually we believe that RCV run off rates should coincide with the accumulated CCD depreciation. This ensures that customers end up paying for the assets that are added to the RCV over their useful lives, ensuring a level of intergenerational equity.

However, through the move to a totex regime, we acknowledge the looser link between assets and the RCV and instead view this as one potential method of calculation. In addition to this, we have considered the average asset lives of the assets in the control, the level of maintenance spend we require, the caps set out in the final methodology, our current RCV run off rates and the overall affordability for customers. We still view the accumulated CCD method to give us the most robust figure but have used the other cross checks to determine any adjustments required.

#### 1.2.2. Calculating rates by considering CCD

We start the process by rolling forward the depreciation of assets already within our fixed asset register, adjusted to current prices using CPIH. We note that in prior controls we would have used RPI to do this; however, with the move to entirely CPIH indexation of the RCV we have made this change to ensure consistency and ensure that we are not overstating the current cost depreciation.

On top of this we add in CCD we expect from assets under construction, from our WIP database, and an adjustment for work that we expect to complete this AMP but is not yet started. We assume that 50% of additions in the year are subject to depreciation within the year, consistent with the approach to RCV run off in the revenue building block formulation.

We have then undertaken a similar analysis for our submitted capital programme, considering the depreciation we expect to arise based on a programme level analysis considering the range of expected asset lives of assets created.

We then compare this to the estimated RCV to give run off rates. We do all this analysis at a forecast nominal level, using the inflation assumptions submitted as part of the business plan (table PD1).

This analysis suggests the following is recovered through RCV run off for legacy (pre-2025) assets - Table 6:

Table 6: RCV run off by Price Control for legacy assets.

Price Control	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	2025-30
Water Resources	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.1	25.1
Water Network	46.8	46.7	46.0	45.5	44.9	230.0
Wastewater Network	110.8	111.8	112.2	111.1	108.7	554.5
Bioresources	17.3	18.0	18.8	18.6	18.3	90.9

#### And the following is recovered through RCV run off for post 2025 investment - Table 7 :

Table 7: RCV run off by Price Control post 2025 investment.

Price Control	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	2025-30
Water Resources	1.4	3.7	5.2	6.3	7.4	23.9
Water Network	2.5	7.7	13.1	18.9	24.8	67.0
Wastewater Network	9.4	22.8	37.1	53.7	71.8	194.8
Bioresources	1.3	5.1	9.2	12.7	15.5	43.9

This suggests a total of c£1.2bn recovered through RCV run-off in 2022-23 prices (tables above are nominal), which results in the following run off rates - Table 8 and Table 9:

Table 8: Run off rates by	Price Control for legacy	assets in 2022-23 prices

Price Control	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	2025-30
Water Resources	5.4%	5.5%	5.7%	5.9%	6.2%	5.7%
Water Network	3.5%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%
Wastewater Network	3.7%	3.8%	3.9%	4.0%	4.0%	3.9%
Bioresources	12.5%	13.5%	14.7%	15.2%	15.5%	14.2%

Price Control	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2029-30	2025-30
Water Resources	4.5%	6.6%	6.3%	5.2%	4.8%	5.4%
Water Network	2.3%	3.4%	3.8%	4.1%	4.3%	3.9%
Wastewater Network	2.3%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%	2.7%
Bioresources	1.8%	2.3%	2.9%	3.1%	3.4%	3.0%

Table 9: Run off rates by Price Control post-2025 investment in 2022-23 prices

### 1.2.3. Cross checks considered

#### Average asset lives

Average asset lives are a useful cross check, however care does need to be given to how they are used. It is very easy to create a hypothetical situation where the actual depreciation looks very different to that implied by a weighted average asset life. The below example Figure 1 sets out a simple hypothetical situation where this approach significantly underestimates the true value. This does mean no weight should be applied to the weighted average asset lives when setting RCV run off rates, however they will represent a lower bound which can be a useful sense check.

Figure 1: Actual annual depreciation versus average asset life depreciation

Asset value	Life	annual depreciation	
10	5	2.0	
10	10	1.0	
10	30	0.3	
10	60	0.2	
		3.5	actual annual depreciation
40	26.3	1.5	implied depreciation on average asset life

Calculating the average asset life based on depreciation over NBV is not fundamentally different to our approach using accumulated CCD. We do believe CCD is more relevant due to the increasing costs over time of replacing assets.

### Comparing revenue recovered through run off and maintenance expenditure

Ofwat referenced part of the rationale for capping RCV run off rates was the disparity between revenues recovered and capital maintenance.

Due to the introduction of the totex regime the link between RCV and assets has been weakened. However, companies have broadly set PAYG rates at a forecast natural level, adjustments have been made for finance-ability and treatment of IRE has differed.

Coupled with potential changes in technology and assets as well as ongoing efficiencies in delivery we would expect that revenues collected through run off to be higher than maintenance. This will be offset by advancing the collection of revenues through PAYG adjustments as we saw at PR19.

This comparison can also be skewed where specific programmes of maintenance are sought, such as increasing mains replacement, which historically was paid for upfront by customers through fast money.

### Ofwat cap of rates

In the final methodology Ofwat present caps on RCV run off rates derived by considering PR19 run off rates and asset lives. We fundamentally disagree with capping these and believe that they create a significant risk of market distortion in the long run. We present the case for this, specifically around bioresources, in WSX36 – Annexes – Financial assumptions underpinning the plan.

However, we do recognise the impact on the immediate affordability that reducing run off rates can have.

### 1.2.4. Adjustments applied

For both water network plus and wastewater network plus we are using the natural RCV run off rates. To aid simplicity we are proposing a single legacy and a single new rate to be applied in each year.

For bioresources, the legacy rate is in excess of the caps set in the final methodology (see Table 8). However, when you consider all assets (no longer separately considering legacy and new assets) you get a rate that is under the cap and does not create any market distortions. We are proposing to use this single rate for all legacy and new assets.

For water resources, the rate exceeds the cap set in the final methodology (see Table 9). Although we believe that these rates are grounded in sound evidence, given the make-up of our proposed capital programme and our unique mix of assets, we have relatively few impounding reservoirs compared to other companies. We are proposing to reduce our runoff rates to the cap given the overall picture on affordability.

This results in the following RCV run off rates Table 10 that we are using:

Table 10: RCV run off rates by Price Control with adjustments for Bioresources and Water Resources

	Legacy Assets	acy Assets		New Assets		
	Natural Rate	Adjustment	Final Rate	Natural Rate	Adjustment	Final Rate
Water Resources	5.7%	-1.2%	4.5%	5.4%	-0.9%	4.5%
Water Network	3.6%	0.0%	3.6%	3.9%	0.0%	3.9%
Wastewater Network	3.9%	0.0%	3.9%	2.7%	0.0%	2.7%
Bioresources	14.2%	-7.8%	6.4%	3.0%	3.4%	6.4%

As a final check we then again work out the total revenue collected through run off and compare it to both the depreciation required as set out in section 1.2.2 - Table 11.

Price control	Revenue from run off	Depreciation
Water Resources	39.6	48.9
Water Network	297.0	297.0
Wastewater Network	749.3	749.3
Bioresources	134.8	134.8
Total	1220.7	1230.1

Table 11: Revenue from run off versus Depreciation by Price Control

This also can be compared to our total (nominal) maintenance submission of £1.14bn, although we do note the potential pitfalls of this approach above.

## 2. Current Cost Depreciation

We have calculated CCD for PR24 on assets to be capitalised in the period on the basis of the average useful economic life of the schemes which will generate the assets.

Costs of assets have been provided directly from CAPEX reporting, as have the useful economic lives. Costs are at 2022/23 price base, Post RPE/Frontier shift adjustment and excluding business rates. These have been weighted based on the percentage split of asset life estimate included for each scheme. Each scheme has been carefully considered and in some instances been deemed to constitute a number of asset classes. Useful economic lives applied align to those used in the audited financial statements.

The asset is then depreciated over the weighted asset life, with an assumed 25% charge in the year of capitalisation. This is based on the historic spread of when, in any given year, assets have been capitalised and ensures that where assets are capitalised earlier in the year an element of this depreciation is captured and included in the calculation herein.

Infrastructure renewals that have been deemed OPEX have been excluded from this calculation and the capitalised element of overheads included accordingly and in line with our treatment of depreciation in the financial statements and Annual Performance Report.

The value of existing assets and assets that are currently being constructed in PR19 but will not be completed until PR24 have also been considered and the depreciation calculated in a similar manner.

## 3. Approach to tax

### 3.1. Tax Strategy

Our tax strategy remains the same as in PR19 and as disclosed within the company's annual report and accounts. We remain committed to maintaining this strategy for PR24. The past, present and future tax strategy is set out below.

### 3.1.1. Our attitude towards UK tax planning

Our approach to tax is fully aligned with our overall objectives. We seek to comply with the spirit and letter of UK tax legislation and claim all tax reliefs and allowances to which we are entitled. We will consider reasonable tax planning opportunities which are in line with our risk appetite. As a rule, we do not enter into complicated structures nor engage in any aggressive or artificial tax planning, because we do not believe it is the correct thing to do. Due to the size and complexity of the UK tax system, tax is a complicated area and uncertainties will arise. Consistent with other business areas, we will seek external advice when required.

## 3.1.2. Approach to risk management and governance arrangements in relation to UK tax

The Chief Finance Officer is ultimately responsible for our tax strategy and engages with relevant individuals within the Company to ensure the strategy is implemented, monitored, and reported to the Board. As a UK regulated business with a significant capital programme, we believe obtaining tax relief on capital expenditure is a key factor affecting our tax liability. Other factors, such as changes in tax legislation or changes in interpretations, may also affect the amount of tax due, compared with what has been allowed as part of the regulatory final determination.

### 3.1.3. The level of risk in relation to UK tax we are prepared to accept

As documented in our finance policy, we adopt a risk-averse and cautious approach to tax. In addition, tax is included as part of our risk assessment framework. We monitor the overall risk framework and provide regular updates to the Board.

### 3.1.4. Our approach towards dealings with HMRC

We have an open, regular, and professional dialogue with HMRC and, as part of its business risk reviews, HMRC have always regarded our Company as low risk. We are committed to maintaining this low-risk status in the long term and believe that our approach to tax and early engagement with HMRC on any area of uncertainty are significant factors in maintaining this low-risk rating. We will also engage with HMRC on industry-wide matters through our membership of Water UK.

### **3.2. Support for tax assumptions**

The current and deferred tax charge in the model is primarily driven by the size of the capital programme and the type of capital expenditure the programme contains. To assist in this exercise, we engaged Chandler KBS. This external consultancy has experience in developing assessment technologies to complete capital allowance work for regulatory purposes. Chandler KBS have acted for Wessex and other Ofwat regulated companies for a number of years.

To determine the relevant tax percentages, Chandler KBS have adopted a bottom-up approach and have considered the expected tax profile of each scheme on a year-by-year basis for the period 2025 to 2030. Due to the fact that less granular data is available for the next 5-year period, we have used the average for the first 5 year for each of the subsequent years.

We are up to date with our tax compliance with HMRC and there are no current open matters. The latest tax computation file is for the period to 30 June 2022.

## 4. Debt strategy

## 4.1. Existing structure

Wessex Water has maintained a simple capital structure since its acquisition by YTL Power International Bhd in 2002. It endeavours to ensure a transparent corporate structure and controls, resulting in strong investment grade credit ratings.

The structure is designed to limit maximum gearing to around 72% (including any unfunded pension deficit) whilst in addition taking account of Ofwat's desired 70% maximum gearing (excluding any unfunded pension deficit).

Bond issues to listed markets are currently undertaken by Wessex Water Services Finance Plc, a 100% subsidiary of the company with a back-to-back guarantee from the appointee.

### 4.2. Our future strategy

Fundamentally it is proposed that nothing should change with regards to financing policy in that no more than 25% of our total borrowing should be exposed to movements in interest rates at any one time and the remaining 75% should be an appropriate mixture of fixed and inflation-based debt.

In September 2022 we launched our Sustainable Finance Framework, which supported our first sustainable bond issued in March 2023. In September 2023 we put in place a £5bn EMTN (Euro Medium Term Note) Programme to increase our flexibility for raising debt as we will be a more regular visitor to the capital markets in future years.

## 5. Dividend Policy

## 5.1. Current policy

The dividend policy is to declare dividends consistent with our performance and prudent management of the economic risk of the business. Dividend payments are reviewed and approved on a quarterly basis by the Board after considering both current and projected business performance.

Whenever a dividend is considered by the Board, a paper is prepared by the Finance Directorate which sets out the purpose of the dividend and how it complies with the dividend policy.

In particular, the Board takes into account:

- Our current and projected performance in delivering the level of service customers expect from an efficient
  water and sewerage company and that where that level of service has not been delivered, that customers
  have been adequately compensated
- that we are delivering the required quality and environmental outputs and making sufficient investment in our infrastructure to maintain and, where necessary, increase resilience
- that the correct amount of tax has been paid
- that we have met any unexpected additional expenditure needs that may have arisen during the year to date, as new operational risks emerge
- the level of regulatory gearing and its comparison with Ofwat's expectations pertaining at the time
- the sufficiency of distributable reserves.

We will maintain a solid investment grade credit rating at all times.

### 5.2. AMP8 Dividends

In order to remain within financial covenants and credit rating metrics and, due to the significant level of spend required during PR24 which in part will be funded by debt, we are currently projecting no dividends will be paid during the 5-year period.

## 6. **Executive Remuneration**

### 6.1. Remuneration Committee

The Executive Remuneration policy is monitored and updated by our Remuneration Committee which consists of four Non-Executive Directors and three shareholder directors. The committee take account of evolving best and market practice and to ensure that the Company's remuneration practices are competitive but not excessive, the Committee has access to detailed external research on market data and trends from experienced specialist consultants. Our bonus plan is designed to promote our success in achieving our objectives over the five-year regulatory period and is based on a portfolio of KPIs linked to our performance scorecard and Ofwat's measures of success.

The Committee ensures that any changes in senior executive remuneration are proportionate in the context of workforce pay. Whilst it does not set a specific policy on the relationship between Executive Directors' pay and that of the rest of the workforce, it aims to ensure that executive salary movement is appropriately aligned to the rest of the workforce, and it specifically considers this aspect as part of its decision-making process.

The Committee considers performance related executive pay in the context of Ofwat's requirement that performance related pay should demonstrate a substantial link to stretching performance delivery for customers, communities, and the environment. We are committed to transparency around the relationship between pay and overall performance.

### 6.2. Remuneration Arrangements

The tables below set out a summary of our Executive Directors' remuneration arrangements (Base Salary & Taxable Benefits - Table 12; Pension - Table 13; Bonus - Table 14), how these link to our strategy, how they operate in practice and the link to relevant performance indicators.

Element of Pay	Purpose and Link to Company Strategy	How Operated in Practice	Maximum Opportunity	Description of performance metrics
Base Salary	To attract and retain the high calibre Executive Directors needed to implement our strategy and maintain our leading position in the industry.	Reviewed annually and takes effect from 1 April. Review takes into consideration: • individual responsibilities	There is no prescribed maximum increase. However, Executive Director salary increases are aligned to those provided to the workforce. Such increases are negotiated by the joint	n/a

Table 12: Executive Directors' remuneration through Base Salary & Taxable Benefits

Element of Pay	Purpose and Link to Company Strategy	How Operated in Practice	Maximum Opportunity	Description of performance metrics
	To provide a competitive salary relative to comparable companies in terms of size and complexity.	<ul> <li>salary levels for similar sized roles in the national utilities market</li> <li>the level of pay increases awarded across the workforce</li> <li>economic and market conditions</li> <li>our performance.</li> </ul>	staff council involving management and trade union representatives.	
Taxable Benefits	To attract and retain high calibre Executive Directors and to remain competitive in the market.	<ul> <li>Benefits include:</li> <li>Company car or allowance and private fuel allowance</li> <li>Private medical insurance and executive health screening</li> </ul>	n/a	n/a

Table 13: Executive Directors' remuneration through Pension

Element of Pay	Purpose and Link to Company Strategy	How Operated in Practice	Maximum Opportunity	Description of performance metrics
Pension	To attract and retain high calibre Executive Directors and to remain competitive in the market.	The majority of current Executive Directors participate in the Company's defined benefit pension scheme. Other Executive Directors participate in the YTL UK Group section of the Aon MasterTrust. Executive Directors are also insured for a lump sum of up to four times their pensionable salary on death in service.	As determined in the latest actuarial valuation.	n/a

Element of Pay	Purpose and Link to Company Strategy	How Operated in Practice	Maximum Opportunity	Description of performance metrics
Bonus	To motivate and reward Executive Directors for the achievement of demanding objectives and key strategic measures (including measures of customer satisfaction, service quality, environmental performance, employee alignment and financial performance) over the financial year and five-year regulatory period. The performance measures set are stretching in the context of the nature, risk and profile of the Company and have regard to historical performance, sector comparisons and the performance commitments made in the relevant business plan. The measures and the weightings of them ensure that bonuses are linked to stretching delivery for customers and the environment.	The Board of Directors sets annual performance targets prior to the commencement of each financial year. Company and individual performance against those targets are measured at the end of the financial year and the level of bonus payable is calculated at that point. The remuneration committee has the discretion to, and does consider for effect of, corporate performance on environmental and governance risks when reviewing Executive Director bonuses to ensure variable remuneration incentivises and rewards appropriate behaviour. Part of the bonus may be forfeited for underperformance in respect of customer service, environmental, regulation and employee related performance targets. Annual bonus is not pensionable.	Maximum bonus opportunity is 100% of base salary.	A combination of key performance indicators relating to customer satisfaction, service quality, environmental performance, employee alignment and financial performance. The Remuneration Committee has absolute discretion in making bonus payments.

#### Table 14: Executive Directors' remuneration through Bonus

## 6.3. Executive Bonus Metrics

Currently we monitor 21 internal performance indicators, as shown below:

Serving people and places	C-Mex / D-MeX / Customers on a tailored assistance programme (TAP) / Water quality CRI (compliance risk index) / Water supply interruptions / Sewer flooding (internal and external incidents) / Restrictions on water use (hosepipe bans)
Enhancing the environment	Leakage / Treatment works compliance / Environmental performance Assessment (EPA) / Greenhouse gas emissions / River with improved water quality (WINEP) / Storm overflow and FFT plan progress / Compliance with abstraction licences
Empowering our people	H&S plan and accident statistics progress / Employee rating company as a good employer / Training plan compliance / Diversity plan progress
Financial measures	Operational costs (excluding other regulated activities) / Net capex / Cashflow before dividends

These performance indicators are reviewed annually to ensure their relevance and link to stretching performance delivery for customers, communities, and the environment.

At the end of each financial year, the Remuneration Committee reviews company and individual performance, taking into account performance against the measures. Only if the Committee judges that three quarters or more of the customer and environmental targets have been achieved, will Executive Directors be eligible for any bonus payment. The Committee would take account of any extenuating circumstances outside our control when determining the level of bonus payments.

The financial performance is only used in determining the size of the bonus award, against targets set by the Board. This aligns with shareholder and customer expectations.

Each performance metric is given a weighting relative to its importance to stakeholders - Table 15:

Table 15: Weighting and opportunity by performance metric

Metric	Weighting	Target Opportunity	Maximum Opportunity
Serving people and place	35.0%	17.5%	35.0%
Enhancing the environment	35.0%	17.5%	35.0%
Empowering our people	10.0%	5.0%	10.0%
Personal objectives	10.0%	5.0%	10.0%
Discretionary award	10.0%	5.0%	10.0%